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Abstract. In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss suggested a cryptographic primitive named proxy
re-signatures where a proxy turns a signature computed under Alice’s secret key into one from Bob on
the same message. The semi-trusted proxy does not learn either party’s signing key and cannot sign
arbitrary messages on behalf of Alice or Bob. At CCS 2005, Ateniese and Hohenberger revisited the
primitive by providing appropriate security definitions and efficient constructions in the random oracle
model. Nonetheless, they left open the problem of designing a multi-use unidirectional scheme where
the proxy is able to translate in only one direction and signatures can be re-translated several times.
This paper solves this problem, suggested for the first time 10 years ago, and shows the first multi-hop
unidirectional proxy re-signature schemes. We describe a random-oracle-using system that is secure in
the Ateniese-Hohenberger model. The same technique also yields a similar construction in the standard
model (i.e. without relying on random oracles). Both schemes are efficient and require newly defined –
but falsifiable – Diffie-Hellman-like assumptions in bilinear groups.
Keywords. Multi-use proxy re-signatures, unidirectionality, pairings.
1 Introduction
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [8] proposed a cryptographic primitive where a semi-trusted proxy is
given some information that allows turning Alice’s signature on a message into Bob’s signature on the same
message. These proxy re-signatures (PRS) – not to be confused with proxy signatures [23] – require that the
proxy be unable to sign on behalf of Alice or Bob on its own. The last few years saw a renewed interest in
proxy re-cryptography [3–5, 17–19,12].
This paper presents the first constructions of multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signature wherein the
proxy can only translate signatures in one direction and messages can be re-signed a polynomial number of
times. Our constructions are efficient and demand new (but falsifiable) Diffie-Hellman-related intractability
assumptions in bilinear map groups. One of our contributions is a secure scheme in the standard model (i.e.
without resorting to the random oracle model).
Related work. Alice – the delegator – can easily designate a proxy translating signatures computed using
Bob’s secret key – the delegatee – into one that are valid w.r.t. her public key by storing her secret key at
the proxy. Upon receiving Bob’s signatures, the proxy can check them and re-sign the message using Alice’s
private key. The problem with this approach is that the proxy can sign arbitrary messages on behalf of Alice.
Proxy re-signatures aim at securely enabling the delegation of signatures without fully trusting the proxy.
They are related to proxy signatures, introduced in [23] and revisted in [16, 9, 22], in that any PRS can be
used to implement a proxy signature mechanism but the converse is not necessarily true.
In 1998, Blaze et al. [8] gave the first example of PRS where signing keys remain hidden from the proxy.
The primitive was formalized in 2005 by Ateniese and Hohenberger [5] who pinned down useful properties
that can be expected from proxy re-signature schemes.
Blaze et al.’s construction is bidirectional (i.e. the proxy information allows “translating” signatures in
either direction) and multi-use (i.e. the translation of signatures can be performed in sequence and multiple
times by distinct proxies without requiring the intervention of signing entities). Unfortunately, Ateniese and
Hohenberger [5] pinpointed a flaw in the latter scheme: given a signature/re-signature pair, anyone can
1. Unidirectional: re-signature keys can only be used for delegation in one direction;
2. Multi-use: a message can be re-signed a polynomial number of times;
3. Private Proxy: re-signature keys can be kept secret by an honest proxy;
4. Transparent: a user may not even know that a proxy exists;
5. Unlinkable: a re-signature cannot be linked to the one from which it was generated;
6. Key optimal: a user is only required to store a constant amount of secret data;
7. Non-interactive: the delegatee does not act in the delegation process;
8. Non-transitive: the proxy cannot re-delegate signing rights;
deduce the re-signature key that has been used in the delegation (i.e. the private proxy property is not
satisfied). Another issue in [8] is that the proxy and the delegatee can collude to expose the delegator’s
secret.
To overcome these limitations, Ateniese and Hohenberger proposed two constructions based on bilinear
maps. The first one is a quite simple multi-use, bidirectional protocol built on Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS)
signatures [11]. Their second scheme is unidirectional (the design of such a scheme was an open problem raised
in [8]) but single-use. It involves two different signature algorithms: first-level signatures can be translated by
the proxy whilst second-level signatures cannot. A slightly less efficient variant was also suggested to ensure
the privacy of re-signature keys kept at the proxy. The security of all schemes was analyzed in the random
oracle model [7].
Our contributions.Ateniese and Hohenberger left as open challenges the design of multi-use unidirectional
systems and that of secure schemes in the standard security model. The present paper solves both problems:
– we present a simple and efficient system (built on the short signature put forth by Boneh et al. [11]) which
is secure in the random oracle model under a reasonable extension of the Diffie-Hellman assumption;
– using an elegant technique due to Waters [27], the scheme is easily modified so as to achieve security in
the standard model. To the best of our knowledge, this actually provides the first unidirectional PRS
that dispenses with random oracles and thereby improves a recent bidirectional construction [25].
Both proposals additionally preserve the privacy of proxy keys (with an improved efficiency w.r.t. [5] in the
case of the first one). They combine almost all of the above properties. As in prior unidirectional schemes,
proxies are not completely transparent since signatures have different shapes and lengths across successive
levels. The size of our signatures actually grows linearly with the number of past translations: signatures at
level ℓ (i.e. that have been translated ℓ− i times if the original version was signed at level i) consist of about
2ℓ group elements. In spite of this blow-up, we retain important benefits:
– signers may want to tolerate a limited number (say t) of signature translations for specific messages. Then,
if at most L translations are permitted in the global system, users can directly generate a signature at
level L− t.
– the conversion of a ℓth level signature is indistinguishable from one generated at level ℓ+1 by the second
signer. The original signer’s identity is moreover perfectly hidden and the verifier only needs the new
signer’s public key.
The simplicity of our schemes makes them attractive for applications that motivated the search for multi-
use unidirectional systems in [5]. One of them was to provide a proof that a certain path was taken in a
directed graph: for instance, U.S. customs only need one public key (the one of the immigration agent who
previously validated a signature on an e-passport) to make sure that a foreign visitor legally entered the
country and went through the required checkpoints. Another application was the conversion of certificates
where valid signatures for untrusted public keys can be turned into signatures that verify under trusted
keys. As exemplified in [5], unidirectional schemes are quite appealing for converting certificates between
ad-hoc networks: using the public key of network B’s certification authority (CA), the CA of network A can
non-interactively compute a translation key and set up a proxy converting certificates from network B within
its own domain without having to rely on untrusted nodes of B.
Roadmap. In the forthcoming sections, we recall the syntax of unidirectional PRS schemes and the security
model in section 2. Section 3 explains which algorithmic assumptions we need. Section 4 describes our
random-oracle-using scheme. Section 5 details how to get rid of the random oracle idealization.
2
2 Model and Security Notions
We first recall the syntactic definition of unidirectional PRS schemes from [5].
Definition 1 (Proxy Re-Signatures). A (unidirectional) proxy re-signature (PRS) scheme for N signers
and L levels (where N and L are both polynomial in the security parameter λ) consists of a tuple of (possibly
randomized) algorithms (Global-Setup,Keygen,ReKeygen, Sign,Re-Sign,Verify) where:
Global-Setup(λ): is a randomized algorithm (possibly run by a trusted party) that takes as input a security
parameter λ and produces a set of system-wide public parameters cp.
Keygen(cp): is a probabilistic algorithm that, on input of public parameters cp, outputs a signer’s pri-
vate/public key pair (sk, pk).
ReKeygen(cp, pki, skj): on input of public parameters cp, signer i’s public key pki and signer j’s private key
skj, this (ideally non-interactive) algorithm outputs a re-signature key Rij that allows translating i’s
signatures into signatures in the name of j.
Sign(cp, ℓ, ski,m): on input of public parameters cp, a message m, a private key ski and an integer ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , L}, this (possibly probabilistic) algorithm outputs a signature σ on behalf of signer i at level ℓ.
Re-Sign(cp, ℓ,m, σ,Rij , pki, pkj): given common parameters cp, a level ℓ < L signature σ from signer i ∈
{1, . . . , N} and a re-signature key Rij, this (possibly randomized) algorithm first checks that σ is valid
w.r.t pki. If yes, it outputs a signature σ
′ which verifies at level ℓ+ 1 under public key pkj.
Verify(cp, ℓ,m, σ, pki): given public parameters cp, an integer ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L}, a message m, an alleged signa-
ture σ and a public key pki, this deterministic algorithm outputs 0 or 1.
For all security parameters λ ∈ N and system-wide parameters cp output by Global-Setup(λ), for all couples
of private/public key pairs (ski, pki), (skj , pkj) produced by Keygen(cp), for any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L} and message
m, we should have
Verify(cp, ℓ,m, Sign(cp, ℓ, ski,m), pki) = 1;
Verify(cp, ℓ,m,ReSign(cp, ℓ,m, Sign(cp, ℓ, ski,m),ReKeygen(cp, pki, skj)), pkj) = 1.
To lighten notations, we sometimes omit to explicitly include public parameters cp that are part of the input
of all but one algorithms.
The security model of [5] considers the following two orthogonal notions termed external and insider
security.
External security: is the security against adversaries outside the system (that differ from the proxy and
delegation partners). This notion demands that the next probability be a negligible function of the
security parameter λ:
Pr[{pki, ski)← Keygen(λ)}i∈[1,N ],
(i⋆, L,m⋆, σ⋆)← AOSign(.),OResign(.)({pki}i∈[1,N ]) :
Verify(L, pki⋆ ,m
⋆, σ⋆) ∧ (i⋆,m⋆) 6∈ Q]
where OSign(.) is an oracle taking as input a message and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} to return a first level
signature σ ← Sign(1, ski,m); the oracle OResign(.) takes as input indices i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a level ℓ
signature σ and returns the output of σ′ ← Re-Sign(ℓ,m, σ,ReKeygen(pki, skj)); and Q denotes the set
of (signer,message) pairs (i,m) queried to OSign(.) or such that a tuple (?, j, i,m), with j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
was queried to OResign(.). This notion only makes sense if re-signing keys are kept private by the proxy.
Internal security: The second security notion considered in [5] strives to protect users, as much as possible,
against dishonest proxies and colluding delegation partners. Three security guarantees should be ensured.
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1. Limited Proxy security: this notion captures the proxy’s inability to sign messages on behalf of
the delegatee or to create signatures for the delegator unless messages were first signed by one of the
latter’s delegatees. Formally, we consider a game where adversaries have all re-signing keys but are
denied access to signers’ private keys. The following probability should be negligible:
Pr
[
{pki, ski)← Keygen(λ)}i∈[1,N ], {Rij ← ReKeygen(pki, skj)}i,j∈[1,N ],
(i⋆, L,m⋆, σ⋆)← AOSign(.,.)
(
{pki}i∈[1,N ], {Rij}i,j∈[1,N ]
)
:
Verify(L, pki⋆ ,m
⋆, σ⋆) ∧m⋆ 6∈ Q
]
where OSign(., .) is an oracle taking as input a message and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} to return a first
level signature σ ← Sign(1, ski,m) and Q stands for the set of messages m queried to the signing
oracle.
2. Delegatee Security: informally, this notion protects the delegatee from a colluding delegator and
proxy. Namely, the delegatee is assigned the index 0. The adversary is provided with an oracle
returning first level signatures on behalf of 0 and is also granted access to re-signature keys1 R0i for
all i 6= 0 (but not Ri0 for any i). Her probability of success
Pr
[
{pki, ski)← Keygen(λ)}i∈[0,N ],
{Rij ← ReKeygen(pki, skj)}i∈{0,...,N},j∈{1,...,N}
(L,m⋆, σ⋆)← AOSign(0,.)
(
pk0, {pki, ski}i∈[1,N ], {Rij}i∈{0,...,N},j∈{1,...,N}
)
:
Verify(L, pk0,m
⋆, σ⋆) ∧m⋆ 6∈ Q
]
,
where Q is the set of messages queried to OSign(0, .), should be negligible.
3. Delegator Security: this notion captures that a collusion between the delegatee and the proxy
should be harmless for the honest delegator. Namely, we consider a target delegator with index 0.
The adversary is given private keys of all other signers i ∈ {1, . . . , N} as well as all re-signature keys
including Ri0 and R0i for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. A signing oracle OSign(0, .) also provides her with first
level signatures for 0. Yet, the following probability should be negligible,
Pr
[
{pki, ski)← Keygen(λ)}i∈[0,N ], {Rij ← ReKeygen(pki, skj)}i,j∈[0,N ],
(1,m⋆, σ⋆)← AOSign(0,.)
(
pk0, {pki, ski}i∈[1,N ], {Rij}i,j∈[0,N ],
)
:
Verify(1, pk0,m
⋆, σ⋆) ∧m⋆ 6∈ Q
]
,
meaning she has little chance of framing user 0 at the first level.
An important difference between external and limited proxy security should be underlined. In the former,
the attacker is allowed to obtain signatures on the target message m⋆ for signers other than i⋆. In the latter,
the target message cannot be queried for signature at all (knowing all proxy keys, the attacker would trivially
win the game otherwise).
3 Bilinear Maps and Complexity Assumptions
Bilinear groups. Groups (G,GT ) of prime order p are called bilinear map groups if there is a mapping
e : G×G→ GT with the following properties:
1. bilinearity: e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab for any (g, h) ∈ G×G and a, b ∈ Z;
2. efficient computability for any input pair;
1 In non-interactive schemes, the adversary can compute those keys herself from pk0 and ski, with i 6= 0, and the
definition can be simplified. In the general case, they remain part of the adversary’s input.
4
3. non-degeneracy: e(g, h) 6= 1GT whenever g, h 6= 1G.
In these groups, we assume the hardness of the well-known Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem
which is to compute gxy given gx and gy.
Flexible Diffie-Hellman problems. Our signatures rely on new generalizations of the Diffie-Hellman
problem. To motivate them, let us first recall the definition of the 2-out-of-3 Diffie-Hellman problem [20].
Definition 2. In a prime order group G, the 2-out-of-3 Diffie-Hellman problem (2-3-CDH) is, given
(g, ga, gb), to find a pair (C,Cab) ∈ G×G with C 6= 1G.
We introduce a potentially harder version of this problem that we call 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem:
Definition 3. The 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem (1-FlexDH) is, given (g,A = ga, B = gb) ∈ G3, to
find a triple (C,Ca, Cab) ∈ (G\{1G})3.
The unforgeability of our multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures is proved assuming the intractability
of a relaxed variant of this problem where more flexibility is permitted in the choice of the base C for the
Diffie-Hellman computation.
Definition 4. The ℓ-Flexible Diffie-Hellman problem (ℓ-FlexDH) is, given (g,A = ga, B = gb) ∈ G3, to
find a (2ℓ+ 1)-uple
(C1, . . . , Cℓ, D
a
1 , . . . , D
a
ℓ , D
ab
ℓ ) ∈ G
2ℓ+1
where logg(Dj) =
∏j
i=1 logg(Ci) 6= 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . ℓ}.
A given instance has many publicly verifiable solutions: a candidate 2ℓ+ 1-tuple (C1, . . . , Cℓ, D
′
1, . . . , D
′
ℓ, T )
is acceptable if e(C1, A) = e(D
′
1, g), e(D
′
j , g) = e(D
′
j−1, Cj) for j = 2, . . . , ℓ and e(D
′
ℓ, B) = e(T, g). The
ℓ-FlexDH assumption is thus falsifiable according to Naor’s classification [24].
In generic groups, the general intractability result given by theorem 1 of [20] by Kunz-Jacques and
Pointcheval implies the generic hardness of ℓ-FlexDH. For completeness, appendix A gives an adaptation of
this result in generic bilinear groups.
Remark 1. The knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA1) [6] was introduced in 1991 by Damg˚ard [14].
Roughly speaking, KEA1 captures the intuition that any algorithm which, given elements (g, gx) ∈ G2,
computes a pair (h, hx) ∈ G2 must “know” logg(h). Under KEA1, the intractability of the ℓ-Flexible Diffie-
Hellman problem is easily seen to be boil down to the Diffie-Hellman assumption. Given (g, ga), an adversary
outputting (C1, D
a
1 ) = (C1, C
a
1 ) necessarily “knows” t1 = logg C1 and thus also (C2, C
a
2 ) = (C2, (D
a
2 )
1/t1)
as well as t2 = logg C2, which in turn successively yields logarithms of C3, . . . , Cℓ. Although the KEA1
assumption is inherently non-falsifiable, it holds in generic groups [15, 1] and our results can be seen as
resting on the combination CDH+KEA1.
Modified Diffie-Hellman problem. The second assumption that we need is that the CDH problem
(ga, gb) remains hard even when g(a
2) is available.
Definition 5. Themodified Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (mCDH) is, given (g, ga, g(a
2), gb) ∈
G4, to compute gab ∈ G.
In fact, we use an equivalent formulation of the problem which is to find hxy given (h, hx, h1/x, hy) (the
equivalence is readily observed by defining g = h1/x, x = a, y = b/a).
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4 A Multi-Hop Scheme in the Random Oracle Model
To provide a better intuition of the underlying idea of our scheme, we first describe its single-hop version
before extending it into a multi-hop system.
Our approach slightly differs from the one in [5] where signers have a “strong” secret and a “weak” secret
that are respectively used to produce first and second level signatures. In our scheme, users have a single
secret but first and second level signatures retain different shapes. Another difference is that our re-signature
algorithm is probabilistic.
We exploit the idea that, given gb ∈ G = 〈g〉 for some b ∈ Z, one can hardly generate a Diffie-Hellman
triple (ga, gb, gab) without knowing the corresponding exponent a [14]. A valid BLS signature [11] (σ =
H(m)x, X = gx) can be blinded into (σ′1, σ
′
2) = (σ
t, Xt) using a random exponent t. An extra element gt
then serves as evidence that (σ′1, σ
′
2) actually hides a valid pair. This technique can be iterated several times
by adding two group elements at each step. To translate signatures from signer i to signer j, the key idea is to
have the proxy perform an appropriate change of variable involving the translation key during the blinding.
The scheme is obviously not strongly unforgeable in the sense of [2] (since all but first level signatures
can be publicly re-randomized) but this “malleability” of signatures is not a weakness whatsoever. It even
turns out to be a desirable feature allowing for the unlinkability of translated signatures w.r.t. original ones.
4.1 The Single Hop Version
In this scheme, signers’ public keys consist of a single group element X = gx ∈ G. Their well-formedness is
thus efficiently verifiable by the certification authority that just has to check their membership in G. This
already improves [5] where public keys (X1, X2) = (g
x, h1/x) ∈ G2 (g and h being common parameters) must
be validated by testing whether e(X1, X2) = e(g, h).
Global-setup(λ): this algorithm chooses bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2
λ. A generator g ∈ G
and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G (modeled as a random oracle in the security proof) are also chosen.
Public parameters only consist of cp := {G,GT , g,H}.
Keygen(λ): user i’s public key is set as Xi = g
xi for a random xi
R← Z∗p.
ReKeygen(xj , Xi): this algorithm outputs the proxy key Rij = X
1/xj
i = g
xi/xj which allows turning signa-
tures from i into signatures from j.
Sign(1, xi,m): to sign m ∈ {0, 1}∗ at level 1, compute σ(1) = H(m)xi ∈ G.
Sign(2, xi,m): to sign m ∈ {0, 1}∗ at level 2, choose t
R← Z∗p and compute
σ(2) = (σ0, σ1, σ2) = (H(m)
xit, Xti , g
t). (1)
Re-Sign(1,m, σ(1), Rij , Xi, Xj): on input ofm ∈ {0, 1}
∗, the re-signature key Rij = g
xi/xj , a signature σ(1) ∈
G and public keys Xi, Xj , check the validity of σ
(1) w.r.t signer i by testing e(σ(1), g) = e(H(m), Xi). If
valid, σ(1) is turned into a signature on behalf of j by choosing t R← Z∗p and computing
σ(2) = (σ′0, σ
′
1, σ
′
2) = (σ
(1)t, Xti , R
t
ij) = (H(m)
xit, Xti , g
txi/xj )
If we set t˜ = txi/xj , we have
σ(2) = (σ′0, σ
′
1, σ
′
2) = (H(m)
xj t˜, X t˜j , g
t˜). (2)
Verify(1,m, σ(1), Xi): this algorithm accepts if e(σ
(1), g) = e(H(m), Xi).
Verify(2,m, σ(2), Xi): a second level signature σ
(2) = (σ0, σ1, σ2) is accepted for the public key Xi if the
following conditions are true.
e(σ0, g) = e(σ1, H(m)) e(σ1, g) = e(Xi, σ2)
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Relations (1) and (2) show that translated signatures have exactly the same distribution as signatures directly
produced by signers at level 2.
In comparison with the only known unidirectional PRS with private re-signing keys (suggested in section
3.4.2 of [5]), this one features shorter second level signatures that must include a Schnorr-like [26] proof of
knowledge in addition to 3 group elements in [5]. On the other hand, signatures of [5] are strongly unforgeable
unlike ours.
It is also worth mentioning that the above scheme only requires the 1-Flexible Diffie-Hellman assumption
which is more classical than the general ℓ-FlexDH.
4.2 How to Obtain Multiple Hops
The above construction can be scaled up into a multi-hop PRS scheme if we iteratively apply the same
idea several times. To prevent the linkability of signatures between successive levels ℓ + 1 and ℓ + 2, the
re-signature algorithm performs a re-randomization using random exponents r1, . . . , rℓ.
Sign(ℓ+ 1, xi,m): to sign m ∈ {0, 1}∗ at the (ℓ + 1)th level, user i chooses (t1, . . . , tℓ)
R← (Z∗p)
ℓ and outputs
σ(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ) ∈ G2ℓ+1 where
σ0 = H(m)
xit1···tℓ ,
{
σk = g
xit1···tℓ+1−k for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
σk = g
tk−ℓ for k ∈ {ℓ+ 1, . . . , 2ℓ}.
Re-Sign(ℓ + 1,m, σ(ℓ+1), Rij , Xi, Xj): on input of a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the re-signature key Rij = gxi/xj ,
a valid (ℓ+ 1)th level signature
σ(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ)
= (H(m)xit1···tℓ , gxit1···tℓ , gxit1···tℓ−1 , . . . , gxit1 , gt1 , . . . , gtℓ) ∈ G2ℓ+1
and public keysXi, Xj , check the validity of σ underXi. If valid, σ is turned into a (ℓ+2)
th level signature
on behalf of j by drawing (r0, r1, . . . , rℓ)
R← (Z∗p)
ℓ+1 and computing σ(ℓ+2) = (σ′0, . . . , σ
′
2ℓ+2) ∈ G
2ℓ+3
where
σ′0 = σ
r0···rℓ
0 and


σ′k = σ
r0···rℓ+1−k
k for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}
σ′ℓ+1 = X
r0
i
σ′ℓ+2 = R
r0
ij
σ′k = σ
rk−ℓ−2
k−2 for k ∈ {ℓ+ 3, . . . , 2ℓ+ 2}.
If we define t˜0 = r0xi/xj and t˜k = rktk for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, we observe that
σ(ℓ+2) = (H(m)xj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ , gxj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ , gxj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ−1 , . . . , gxj t˜0 , gt˜0 , . . . , gt˜ℓ) ∈ G2ℓ+3
Verify(ℓ + 1,m, σ(ℓ+1), Xi): the validity of σ
(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ) ∈ G2ℓ+1 at level (ℓ+1) is checked by testing
if these equalities simultaneously hold:
e(σ0, g) = e(H(m), σ1), e(σℓ, g) = e(Xi, σℓ+1)
e(σk, g) = e(σk+1, σ2ℓ−k+1) for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ− 1}
4.3 Security
Theorem 1. The L-level scheme is a secure unidirectional proxy re-signature under the (L−1)-FlexDH and
mCDH assumptions in the random oracle model.
Proof. Limited proxy security. We show that an adversary A1 with advantage ε implies an algorithm B1
solving an (L− 1)-FlexDH instance (g,A = ga, B = gb) with probability O(ε/qs), where qs is the number of
signing queries made by A1.
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System parameters: A1 is challenged on parameters {G,GT , g,OH} where OH is the random oracle con-
trolled by the simulator B1.
Public key generation: when A1 asks for the creation of user i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, B1 responds with a newly
generated public key Xi = A
xi = gaxi, for a random xi
R← Z∗p, which virtually defines user i’s private
key as axi. For all pairs (i, j), re-signature keys Rij are calculated as Rij = g
xi/xj = gaxi/axj .
Oracle queries: A1’s queries are tackled with as follows. Following a well-known technique due to Coron
[13], a binary coin c ∈ {0, 1} with expected value 1−ζ ∈ [0, 1] decides whether B1 introduces the challenge
in the output of the random oracle or an element of known signature. For the optimal value of ζ, this
introduces the loss factor O(qs) in the success probability.
• Random oracle queries: To respond to these queries, B1 maintains a list (referred to as the H-List)
of tuples (m,h, µ, c) as follows:
1. If the query m already appears in the H-List, then B1 returns h;
2. Otherwise, B1 generates a random bit c such that Pr[c = 0] = ζ;
3. It picks uniformly at random µ ∈ Z∗p and computes h = g
µ if c = 0 and h = Bµ otherwise;
4. It adds the 4-uple (m,h, µ, c) to the H-List and returns h as the answer to the random oracle
query.
• Signing queries: when a signature of signer i is queried for a message m, B1 runs the random oracle
to obtain the 4-uple (m,h, µ, c) contained in the H-List. If c = 1 then B1 reports failure and aborts.
Otherwise, the algorithm B1 returns hxia = Axiµ as a valid signature on m.
After a number of queries, A1 comes up with a message m⋆, that was never queried for signature for any
signer, an index i⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a Lth level forgery σ⋆(L) = (σ⋆0 , . . . , σ2L−2
⋆) ∈ G2L−1. At this stage,
B1 runs the random oracle to obtain the 4-uple (m⋆, h⋆, µ⋆, c⋆) contained in the H-List and fails if c⋆ = 0.
Otherwise, if σ⋆(L) is valid, it may be written
(σ⋆0 , . . . , σ2L−2
⋆) =
(
Bµ
⋆xi⋆at1...tL−1 , At1,...tL−1 , . . . , At1 , gt1 , . . . , gtL−1
)
which provides B1 with a valid tuple (C1, . . . , CL−1, Da1 , . . . , D
a
L−1, D
ab
L−1), where D
ab
L−1 = σ
⋆
0
1/µ⋆xi⋆ , so that
logg(Dj) =
∏j
i=1 logg(Ci) for j ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}. A similar analysis to [13, 11] gives the announced bound on
B1’s advantage if the optimal probability ζ = qs/(qs + 1) is used when answering hash queries.
Delegatee security. We also show how to break the (L − 1)-FlexDH assumption out of a delegatee security
adversary A2. Given an input pair (A = ga, B = gb), the simulator B2 proceeds as B1 did in the proof of
limited proxy security.
System parameters and public keys: the target delegatee’s public key is set X0 = A = g
a. For i =
1, . . . , n, other public keys are defined as Xi = g
xi for a random xi
R← Z∗p. To generate re-signature keys
Rij , B2 sets Rij = gxi/xj when i, j 6= 0 and R0j = A1/xj = ga/xj for j = 1, . . . , n.
Queries: A2’s hash and signing queries are handled exactly as in the proof of limited proxy security. Namely,
B2 fails if A2 asks for a signature on a message m for which H(m) = Bµ and responds consistently
otherwise.
When A2 outputs her forgery σ⋆
(L) = (σ⋆0 , . . . , σ
⋆
2L−2) at level L, B2 is successful if H(m
⋆) = Bµ
⋆
, for some
µ⋆ ∈ Z∗p, and extracts an admissible (2L− 1)-uple as done in the proof of limited proxy security.
Delegator security. This security property is proven under the mCDH assumption. Given an adversary A3
with advantage ε, we outline an algorithm B3 that has probability O(ε/qs) of finding gab given (g,A =
ga, A′ = g1/a, B = gb).
Public key generation: as previously, the target public key is defined as X0 = A = g
a. Remaining public
keys are set as Xi = g
xi for a random xi
R← Z∗p for i = 1, . . . , n. This time, A3 aims at producing a first
level forgery and is granted all re-signature keys, including R0j and Rj0. For indexes (i, j) s.t. i, j 6= 0,
B3 sets Rij = gxi/xj . If i = 0, it calculates R0j = A1/xj = ga/xj . If j = 0 (and thus i 6= 0), B3 computes
Ri0 = A
′xi = gxi/a to A3.
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Hash and signing queries are dealt with exactly as for previous adversaries. Eventually, A3 produces a first
level forgery σ⋆(1) for a new message m⋆. Then, B3 can extract gab if H(m) = (gb)µ
⋆
for some µ⋆ ∈ Z∗p,
which occurs with probability O(1/qs) using Coron’s technique [13]. Otherwise, B3 fails.
External security. We finally show that an external security adversary A4 also allows breaking the (L− 1)-
FlexDH assumption almost exactly as in the proof of limited proxy security. The simulator B4 is given an
instance (g,A = ga, B = gb). As previously, B4 must “program” the random oracle H hoping that its output
will be H(m⋆) = Bµ
⋆
(where µ⋆ ∈ Z∗p is known) for the message m
⋆ that the forgery σ⋆(L) pertains to.
The difficulty is that B4 must also be able to answer signing queries made on m⋆ for all but one signers.
Therefore, B4 must guess which signer i⋆ will be A4’s prey beforehand. At the outset of the game, it thus
chooses an index i⋆ R← {1, . . . , N}. Signer i⋆’s public key is set as Xi⋆ = A = ga. All other signers i 6= i⋆
are assigned public keys Xi = g
xi for which B4 knows the matching secret xi and can thus always answer
signing queries.
Hash queries and signing queries involving i⋆ are handled as in the proof of limited proxy security. When
faced with a re-signing query from i to j for a valid signature σ(ℓ) at level ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L}, B4 ignores σ(ℓ) and
simulates a first level signature for signer j. The resulting signature σ′
(1)
is then turned into a (ℓ+1)th level
signature and given back to A4. A re-signing query thus triggers a signing query that only causes failure if
H(m) differs from gµ for a known µ ∈ Z∗p.
When A4 forges a signature at level L, B4 successfully extract a (2L − 1)-Flexible Diffie-Hellman tuple
(as B1 and B2 did) if H(m⋆) = (gb)µ
⋆
and if it correctly guessed the identity i⋆ of the target signer. If A4’s
advantage is ε, we find O(ε/(N(qs + qrs + 1))) as a lower bound on B4’s probability of success, qs and qrs
being the number of signature and re-signature queries respectively. ⊓⊔
5 Eliminating the Random Oracle
Several extensions of BLS signatures have a standard model counterpart when Waters’ technique supersedes
random oracle manipulations (e.g. [21]). Likewise, we can very simply twist our method and achieve the first
unidirectional PRS scheme (even including single hop ones) that avoids the random oracle model. Mutatis
mutandis, the scheme is totally similar to our first construction and relies on the same assumptions.
5.1 The Single Hop Variant
As in [27], n denotes the length of messages to be signed. Arbitrary long messages can be signed if we
first apply a collision-resistant hash function with n-bit outputs, in which case n is part of the security
parameter.
The scheme requires a trusted party to generate common public parameters. However, this party can
remain off-line after the setup phase.
Global-setup(λ, n): given security parameters λ, n, this algorithm chooses bilinear groups (G,GT ) of order
p > 2λ, generators g, h R← G and a random (n+1)-vector u = (u′, u1, . . . , un)
R← Gn+1. The latter defines
a function F : {0, 1}n → G mapping n-bit strings m = m1 . . .mn (where mi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ {0, 1})
onto F (m) = u′ ·
∏n
i=1 u
mi
i . The public parameters are
cp := {G,GT , g, h, u}.
Keygen(λ): user i sets his public key as Xi = g
xi for a random xi
R← Z∗p.
ReKeygen(xj , Xi): given user j’s private key xj and user i’s public key Xi, generate the re-signature key
Rij = X
1/xj
i = g
xi/xj that will be used to translate signature from i into signatures from j.
Sign(1,m, xi): to sign a message m = m1 . . .mn ∈ {0, 1}n at the first level, the signer picks r
R← Z∗p at
random and computes
σ(1) = (σ0, σ1) = (h
xi · F (m)r, gr)
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Sign(2,m, xi): to generate a second level signature on m = m1 . . .mn ∈ {0, 1}n, the signer chooses r, t
R← Z∗p
and computes
σ(2) = (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3) = (h
txi · F (m)r, gr, Xti , g
t) (3)
Re-Sign(1,m, σ(1), Rij , Xi, Xj): on input of a message m ∈ {0, 1}n, the re-signature key Rij = gxi/xj , a
signature σ(1) = (σ0, σ1) and public keys Xi, Xj , check the validity of σ w.r.t signer i by testing if
e(σ0, g) = e(Xi, h) · e(F (m), σ1) (4)
If σ(1) is a valid, it can be turned into a signature on behalf of j by choosing r′, t R← Z∗p and computing
σ(2) = (σ′0, σ
′
1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) = (σ
t
0 · F (m)
r′ , σt1 · g
r′ , Xti , R
t
ij)
= (htxi · F (m)r
′′
, gr
′′
, Xti , g
txi/xj )
where r′′ = tr + r′. If we set t˜ = txi/xj , we observe that
σ(2) = (σ′0, σ
′
1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3) = (h
t˜xj · F (m)r
′′
, gr
′′
, X t˜j , g
t˜) (5)
Verify(1,m, σ(1), Xi): the validity of a first level signature σ
(1) = (σ1, σ2) is checked by testing if relation (4)
holds.
Verify(2,m, σ(2), Xi): a second level signature σ
(2) = (σ0, σ1, σ2, σ3) is accepted for the public key Xi if the
following conditions are true.
e(σ0, g) = e(σ2, h) · e(F (m), σ
′
1) (6)
e(σ2, g) = e(Xi, σ3) (7)
To the best of our knowledge, the above scheme is the first unidirectional PRS in the standard model and
solves another problem left open in [5] where all constructions require the random oracle model. Like the
scheme of section 4, this extension of Waters’ signature [27] is scalable into a multi-hop PRS.
5.2 The Multi-Hop Extension
At levels ℓ ≥ 2, algorithms Sign, Re-Sign and Verify are generalized as follows.
Sign(ℓ+ 1,m, xi): to sign m ∈ {0, 1}n at level ℓ + 1, user i picks r
R← Z∗p, (t1, . . . , tℓ)
R← (Z∗p)
ℓ and outputs
σ(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ+1) ∈ G2ℓ+2 where

σ0 = h
xit1···tℓ · F (m)r
σ1 = g
r
σk = g
xit1···tℓ+2−k for k ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ+ 1}
σk = g
tk−ℓ−1 for k ∈ {ℓ+ 2, . . . , 2ℓ+ 1}.
Re-Sign(ℓ + 1,m, σ(ℓ+1), Rij , Xi, Xj): on input of a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, the re-signature key Rij = gxi/xj ,
a purported (ℓ+ 1)th level signature
σ(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ+1)
= (hxit1···tℓ · F (m)r , gr, gxit1···tℓ , gxit1···tℓ−1 , . . . , gxit1 , gt1 , · · · , gtℓ) ∈ G2ℓ+2
and public keys Xi, Xj, check the correctness of σ
(ℓ+1) under Xi. If valid, σ
(ℓ+1) is translated for Xj by
sampling r′ R← Z∗p, (r0, r1, . . . , rℓ)
R← (Z∗p)
ℓ+1 and setting σ(ℓ+2) = (σ′0, . . . , σ
′
2ℓ+3) ∈ G
2ℓ+4 where


σ′0 = σ
r0···rℓ
0 · F (m)
r′
σ′1 = σ
r0···rℓ
1 · g
r′
σ′k = σ
r0···rℓ+2−k
k for k ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ+ 1}
σ′ℓ+2 = X
r0
i
σ′ℓ+3 = R
r0
ij
σ′k = σ
rk−ℓ−3
k−2 for k ∈ {ℓ+ 4, . . . , 2ℓ+ 3}.
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If we define t˜0 = r0xi/xj , r
′′ = r0 · · · rℓ + r′ and t˜k = rktk for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, we observe that
σ(ℓ+2) = (hxj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ · F (m)r
′′
, gr
′′
, gxj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ , gxj t˜0 t˜1···t˜ℓ−1 , . . . , gxj t˜0 , gt˜0 , . . . , gt˜ℓ)
Verify(ℓ + 1,m, σ(ℓ+1), Xi): a candidate signature σ
(ℓ+1) = (σ0, . . . , σ2ℓ+1) is verified by testing if the fol-
lowing equalities hold:
e(σ0, g) = e(h, σ3) · e(F (m), σ1)
e(σk, g) = e(σk+1, σ2ℓ+3−k) for k ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}
e(σℓ+1, g) = e(Xi, σℓ+2)
5.3 Security
Theorem 2. The scheme with L levels (and thus at most L− 1 hops) is a secure unidirectional PRS under
the (L− 1)-FlexDH and mCDH assumptions.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one of theorem 1 and replaces random oracle manipulations by the
tricks of [10, 27]. We prove the limited proxy and delegatee security properties under the (L − 1)-FlexDH
assumption. The delegator security is demonstrated under the mCDH assumption.
Limited proxy security. We consider an adversary A1 with advantage ε. We describe an algorithm B1 solving
a (L− 1)-FlexDH instance (A = ga, B = gb) with probability ε/4qs(n+1), where qs is the number of signing
queries made by A1, within a comparable time.
System parameters: The simulator B1 prepares common public parameters as follows. It first sets h =
B = gb. The (n+1)-vector u = (u′, u1, . . . , un) is defined by choosing u
′ = hw
′−κτ · gz
′
and ui = h
wi · gzi
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} using random vectors (w′, w1, . . . , wn)
R← Zn+1τ , (z
′, z1, . . . , zn)
R← Zn+1p , where κ
R←
{0, . . . , n} is randomly chosen and τ = 2qs. For any message m = m1 . . .mn ∈ {0, 1}n, we have
F (m) = u′ ·
n∏
i=1
umii = h
J(m)gK(m)
for functions J : {0, 1}n → Z, K : {0, 1}n → Zp respectively defined as J(m) = w′+
∑n
i=1 wimi−κτ and
K(m) = z′ +
∑n
i=1 zimi. As in [27], B1 will be successful if J(m
⋆) = 0 for the message m∗ of the forgery
stage whereas J(m) 6= 0 for all messages m 6= m∗ queried for signature. Since |J(.)| ≤ τ(n + 1) ≪ p,
we have J(m⋆) = 0 with non-negligible probability O(1/τ(n + 1)). The adversary A1 is challenged on
parameters (g, h, u).
Key generation: for user i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, B1 defines a public key as Xi = Axi = gaxi , for a random
xi
R← Z∗p, which virtually defines user i’s private key as axi. For pairs (i, j), re-signature keys are chosen
as Rij = g
xi/xj = gaxi/axj .
Signing queries: when a signature of signer i is queried for a message m, B1 fails if J(m) = 0 mod p.
Otherwise, following the technique of [10, 27], it can construct a signature by picking r R← Zp and
computing
σ = (σ1, σ2) =
(
X
−K(m)
J(m)
i · F (m)
r, X
− 1
J(m)
i · g
r
)
.
which is returned to AI . If we define r˜ = r − (axi)/J(m), σ has the correct distribution as
σ1 = X
−K(m)
J(m)
i · F (m)
r = X
−K(m)
J(m)
i · F (m)
r˜ · (hJ(m) · gK(m))
axi
J(m) = haxi · F (m)r˜
and σ2 = g
r−(axi)/J(m) = gr˜.
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After polynomially many queries, A1 comes up with a message, that was never queried for signature for any
signer, and index i⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a forgery
σ(L)
⋆
= (σ⋆0 , . . . , σ
⋆
2L−1)
= (haxi⋆ t
⋆
1···t
⋆
L−1 · F (m)r
⋆
, gr
⋆
, gaxi⋆t
⋆
1 ···t
⋆
L−1 , gaxi⋆t
⋆
1 ···t
⋆
L−2 ,
. . . , gaxi⋆t
⋆
1 , gt
⋆
1 , · · · , gt
⋆
L−1) ∈ G2L
at level L. At this stage, B1 fails if J(m
⋆) 6= 0 mod p. Otherwise, if σ(L)
⋆
is valid,
σ0
⋆ = haxi⋆ t
⋆
1···t
⋆
L−1 · gr
⋆K(m⋆)
which provides B1 with a valid (2L− 1)-uple
(C1, . . . , CL−1, D
a
1 , . . . , D
a
L−1, D
ab
L−1)
=
(
σL+1
⋆, . . . , σ2L−1
⋆, σL
⋆1/xi⋆ , . . . , , σ2
⋆1/xi⋆ ,
( σ0⋆
σ1⋆
K(m⋆)
)1/xi⋆)
=
(
gt
⋆
1 , . . . , gt
⋆
L−1 , gat
⋆
1 , . . . , gat
⋆
1···t
⋆
L−1 , gt
⋆
1···t
⋆
L−1ab
)
.
A completely similar analysis to [27] shows that J(m⋆) = 0 with probability 1/4qs(n + 1), which yields the
bound on B1’s advantage.
Delegatee security. A delegatee security adversaryA2 also implies a breach in the (L−1)-FlexDH assumption.
The simulator B2 is given (A = ga, B = gb) and uses a strategy that is completely analogous to the one of
simulator B1 in the proof of limited proxy security.
System parameters and public keys: B2 prepares public parameters exactly as in the proof of limited
proxy security. The public key of the target user is defined as X0 = A = g
a. The attacker A2 must be
provided with private keys for all the delegators of that user. For i = 1, . . . , n, other public keys are
therefore chosen as Xi = g
xi for randomly picked xi
R← Z∗p. The adversary A2 then receives {g, h =
B, u,X0 = g
a, x1, . . . , xn} as well as re-signature keys Rij for i ∈ {0, . . . , N} and j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. These
are set as R0j = A
1/xj = ga/xj and Rij = g
xi/xj if i 6= 0.
Signing queries: for all signers i 6= 0, A2 can generate signatures on her own. When a signature of the
target signer is requested for a message m, B2 proceeds as B1 did when facing the limited proxy adversary
A1. It fails if J(m) = 0 mod p and can answer the query otherwise.
When A2 eventually outputs a forgery (σ⋆0 , . . . , σ
⋆
2L−1) at level L, B2 is successful if J(m
⋆) = 0 and extracts
an admissible (2L− 1)-uple as B1 did.
Delegator security. A delegator security adversary A3 having advantage ε after qs signing queries is finally
shown to imply an algorithm B3 to solve a problem which is equivalent (under linear time reduction) to the
mCDH problem with probability ε/4qs(n+ 1). Given (g,A = g
a, A′ = g1/a, B = gb), this problem is to find
out gab.
Public parameters and public key generation: Again, system parameters are prepared as in the proof
of limited proxy security. Namely, B3 defines h = B = gb and chooses u′, u1, . . . , un so as to have F (m) =
hJ(m) ·gK(m) for some functions J,K : {0, 1}n → Zp where J cancels with non-negligible probability. The
public key of the target delegator is set as X0 = A = g
a. For i = 1, . . . , n, remaining public keys are set as
Xi = g
xi for a random xi
R← Z∗p. The adversary A3 receives {g, h = B, u,X0 = g
a, x1, . . . , xn}. This time,
she is provided with all re-signature keys (including R0j and Rj0) and attempts to produce a first level
forgery. For pairs (i, j) such that i, j 6= 0, B3 sets Rij = g
xi/xj . If i = 0, it defines R0j = A
1/xj = ga/xj .
If j = 0 (and thus i 6= 0), B3 calculates Ri0 = A′
xi = gxi/a and hands {Rij}i,j to A3.
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Signing queries: when A3 asks for a signature from the target delegator for a message m, B3 fails if
J(m) = 0 mod p and can answer the query exactly as in the proof of limited proxy security otherwise.
Eventually, A3 produces a first level forgery σ(1)
⋆
= (σ1
⋆, σ2
⋆) for a message m⋆ that was never queried
for signature. If J(m⋆) 6= 0, B3 fails. Otherwise, given that (σ1⋆, σ2⋆) = (ha · grK(m
⋆), gr), B3 finds out
gab = σ1
⋆/σ2
⋆K(m
⋆).
External Security. We consider an adversary A4 with advantage ε. We describe an algorithm B4 solving a
(L− 1)-FlexDH instance (A = ga, B = gb) with probability ε/(4N(qs+ qrs)(n+1)) within comparable time,
where qs and qrs are is the number of signing and re-signing queries.
System parameters: The simulator B4 prepares common public parameters as in the limited proxy security
proof. In addition, it picks at random an integer i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Public key generation: when A4 asks for the creation of user i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, B4 responds
– with a newly generated public key Xi = g
xi, for a random xi
R← Z∗p if i 6= i
∗ (s.t. xi, user i’s private
key, is known to the simulator);
– with Xi∗ = A if i = i
∗ (which virtually defines user i’s private key as a).
Oracle queries: A4’s queries are tackled with as follows.
• Signing queries: when a signature of signer i is queried for a message m,
- B4 uses its knowledge of xi to produce the signature if i 6= i∗;
- B4 uses the simulation from the limited proxy security proof if i = i∗ (and therefore fails if
J(m) = 0 mod p).
• Re-signing queries: for such a query on input (m, σ(ℓ), i, j), B4 checks if σ(ℓ) is a valid ℓth level
signature on m for some ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1} with respect to the public key i. If yes, B4 produces a
first level signature on m for user j (using the previous simulation strategy), increases its level up to
ℓ+1 (for the same public key) using the re-signing algorithm (with re-signature key simply equal to
g) and outputs the resulting (ℓ + 1)th level signature. The simulation only fails if J(m) = 0 mod p
and j = i∗.
After polynomially many queries, A4 comes up with a message m⋆, an index j⋆ ∈ {1, . . . , N} and a forgery
σ(L)
⋆
∈ G2L at level L. Recall that m⋆ cannot have been queried to signer j⋆. Again, B4 fails if J(m⋆) 6=
0 mod p or j⋆ 6= i∗. Otherwise, if σ(L)
⋆
is valid, B4 produces a valid (L − 1)-FlexDH-tuple as in the limited
proxy security proof. A completely similar analysis to this proof ends up with the announced bound on B4’s
advantage. ⊓⊔
6 Conclusions and Open Problems
We described the first multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures, which solves a problem left open in 2005.
The random-oracle-based proposal also offers efficiency improvements over existing solutions at the first level.
The other scheme additionally happens to be the first unidirectional PRS in the standard model.
Two major open problems remain. First, it would be interesting to see if multi-level unidirectional PRS
have efficient realizations under more classical intractability assumptions. A perhaps more challenging task
would be to find out implementations of such primitives where the size of signatures and the verification cost
grow sub-linearly with the number of translations.
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A Generic hardness of ℓ-FlexDH in bilinear groups
To provide more confidence in the ℓ-FlexDH assumption we prove a lower bound on the computational
complexity of the ℓ-FlexDH problem for generic groups equiped with bilinear maps. In [20], Kunz-Jacques
and Pointcheval define a family of computational problems that enables to study variants of the CDH
problem in the generic group model. Let A be an adversary in this model and ϕ(X1, . . . , Xk, Y1, . . . , Yℓ) be
a multivariate polynomial whose coefficients might depend on A’s behaviour. For values of x1, . . . , xk chosen
by the simulator, and knowing their encodings, the goal of A is to compute the encodings of y1, . . . , yℓ such
that
ϕ(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yℓ) = 0.
All elements manipulated by A are linear polynomials in x1, . . . , xk and some new random elements in-
troduced through the group oracle. Let us denote Pi the polynomial corresponding to yi (it is a random
variable), Kunz-Jacques and Pointcheval proved the following result.
Theorem 3 ([20]). Let d = deg(ϕ) and Pm be an upper bound for the probability
Pr[ϕ(X1, . . . , Xk, P1(X1, . . . , Xk), . . . , Pℓ(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 0]
Then the probability that A wins after qG queries satisfies
Succ(qG) ≤ Pm +
(3qG + k + 2)
2p
+
d
p
.
The choice φ(X1, X2, Y1, . . . , Yℓ+1) = Yℓ+1 − X1X2Y1 . . . Yℓ implies the generic hardness of the problem ℓ-
FlexDH in groups. The purpose of this section is to prove that Kunz-Jacques and Pointcheval result also
holds in generic bilinear groups and therefore that the problem ℓ-FlexDH is intractable in these groups.
Theorem 4. Let d = deg(ϕ) and Pm be an upper bound for the probability
Pr[ϕ(X1, . . . , Xk, P1(X1, . . . , Xk), . . . , Pℓ(X1, . . . , Xk)) = 0]
Then the probability that A wins after qG oracle queries to the group operations in G, GT to the bilinear
map e satisfies
Succ(qG) ≤ Pm +
(3qG + k + 2)
p
+
d
p
.
Proof. In the following I and IT , denote the set {0, . . . , p− 1} and are used to represent elements of G and
GT respectively. Following [20], in the generic bilinear group model, an adversary A has access to
– an oracle G that, on input (a, b, r, r′) ∈ Z2 × I2, answers with the representation of ax+ bx′ in I, where
r is the representation of x and r′ the representation of x′.
– an oracle GT that, on input (a, b, r, r
′) ∈ Z2 × I2T , answers with the representation of ax + bx
′ in IT ,
where r is the representation of x and r′ the representation of x′.
– an oracle E that, on input (a, b, r, r′) ∈ Z2× I2, answers with the representation of ax+ bx′ in IT , where
r is the representation of x and r′ the representation of x′.
The connection between representations and elements of Zp is managed by the simulator through two lists L
and LT of pairs (x, r) associating an element with its representation. A representation r in an oracle query
input does not need to correspond to an element of Zp in L or LG; if it does, the corresponding element is
used, otherwise a random element x is drawn by the simulator in Zp and bound to r, that is, (x, r) is added
to L or LG. The same rule applies for the answer to the query: if ax + bx′ = x′′ with (x′′, r′′) in L or LG,
r′′ is answered. Otherwise, a random representation r′′, is chosen and (x′′, r′′) is added to L or LG, and the
answer to the oracle query is r′′. Overall, each oracle query adds at most 3 pairs to L or LG.
For our problem, initially we have
L = {(0, rz), (1, re), (x1, r1), . . . , (xk, rk)} and LT = ∅
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and A is given rz , re, r1, . . . , rk. A’s goal is to output r′1, . . . , r
′
ℓ corresponding to y1, . . . , yℓ in Zp that, together
with the xi’s, cancel ϕ. The last queries of A are assumed to be of the form G(1, 0, r′i, re). A has won if
ϕ(x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yℓ) = 0 where (yi, r
′
i) ∈ L.
To prove the generic hardness of the problem, we consider a simulator S′ where random values in Zp are
replaced by formal unknowns Xi. Represents of elements of G (resp. GT ) correspond to linear combinations
(resp. quadratic polynomials) of these unknowns with coefficients in Zp. The simulation is similar to the
one given in [20] and A’s goal is to output r′1, . . . , r
′
ℓ corresponding to linear polynomials P1, . . . , Pℓ in
Zp[X1, . . . , X, . . .] that, together with the unknowns Xi’s, cancel ϕ.
The difference between A’s success probability in the two simulation occurs only if S′’s simulation, the
representations of different polynomials (linear or quadratic) P1 and P2 collide in S’s simulation. The number
of polynomials in L and LT is upper-bounded by 3qG+k+2 and their degrees is at most two. Therefore, the
difference appears with probability at most (3qG+k+2)
2/p. As in [20], the success criterion in S′’s simulation
is stricter than in S’s simulation and as above the probability that A succeeds in S’s simulation but not in
S′’s simulation is upper-bounded by d/p (since ϕ is of degree d and the Pi’s are linear polynomial). ⊓⊔
16
